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Abstract
This study considers a mixed duopoly in which a socially responsible firm com-
petes with a private firm by incorporating environmental externality and clean
technology. We analyze the endogenous market structure in which both firms
strategically decides quantities sequentially or simultaneously, which also affects
abatement activities. We show that depending on the relative concerns on en-
vironment and consumers surplus, the socially responsible firm can be less or
more aggressive in the production and abatement. Thus, not only the signif-
icance of externality but also the instrumental conflict of social concerns are
crucial factors in determining the equilibrium of endogenous timing game, in
which the socially responsible firm might earn higher profits.
Keywords: endogenous timing; socially responsible firm; mixed duopoly;
clean technology; environmental externality
JEL classification: L13; L31; Q5
1. Introduction
Conventional economic theory regards firms as entities whose sole objective
is to maximize their profits. In the real world, however, many private firms
have voluntarily and increasingly paid attention to corporate social responsi-
bility(CSR).1 Due to the current expansion of CSR, in most countries, many
industries are characterized by the simultaneous presence of for-profit firms and
not-for-profit firms. It represents that the heterogeneity of objectives among
the firms emerges as an important research topic in the literature.2
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: aru.gmtz@hotmail.com (Arturo Garc´ıa), mariellealc@gmail.com
(Mariel Leal), sangho@chonnam.ac.kr (Sang-Ho Lee)
1A large number of companies participated in greenhouse gas reduction programs and
issued various statements on CSR and outlined activities in their annual reports. For example,
see CSR trend report by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010) and KPMG (2013, 2015).
2Chirco et al. (2013) show that behavioral heterogeneity may be the equilibrium outcome
of the strategic interaction of ex-ante identical agents, while Matsumura and Ogawa (2014)
investigate that the heterogeneity may produce the different market structure.
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The recent topic on CSR has received increasing attention from broad re-
search in both empirical and theoretical economics.3 Numerous studies have
also formulated theoretical approaches on the CSR in the field of applied mi-
croeconomic theory.4 They analyzed different competition models of oligopolies
where profit-maximizing firms compete with their rival firms that adopt CSR
activities. In particular, they utilized a model in which the firm adopts consumer
surplus as a proxy of its own CSR concerns. That is, a CSR initiative includes
both profitability and consumer surplus, and thus the objective of CSR firm is a
combination of consumers surplus and its own profits. They found that the CSR
firm may achieve a higher profit and welfare in a quantity-setting competition.5
However, these results put aside the concern on environmental problem, which
is becoming an essential part of CSR behavior and thus it is a more realistic
representation of how CSR firms operate.6
In this paper, we define a socially responsible (SR) firm that takes into
account its profits and social concerns, which include not only consumers sur-
plus but environmental externality. In fact, these two social concerns have
opposite effects on production and abatement. While the concern on environ-
ment restrains the production of an SR firm and increase abatement activities,
the concern on consumer surplus expands the production and decreases costly
abatement. Thus, the commitment to social concerns may allow the SR firm to
include different production strategy, which induces the SR firm to be more or
less aggressive compared to its rival firm, and thus the competition in a mixed
duopoly leads the different market structure.
We consider a mixed duopoly model in which an SR firm with social concerns
competes against a for-profit (FP) private firm by incorporating environmen-
tal externality and clean technology. We then analyze the endogenous market
structure and examine whether the SR firm strategically decides quantities se-
quentially or simultaneously, which also affects abatement activities. In specific,
as formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we investigate an observable de-
lay game in which the role of a leader or a follower in a mixed duopoly is
determined endogenously.7 In the presence of clean technology, we show that
3For the intensive discussions on the empirical works on CSR, see Schreck (2011) and Crifo
and Forget (2015). Lyon and Maxwell (2004) and Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) provided
fruitful discussions on the practical and academic issues on CSR.
4Recent theoretical research on the CSR activities includes Goering (2012, 2014), Kopel
and Brand (2012), Brand and Grothe (2013, 2015), Nakamura (2014), Chang et al. (2014),
Kopel (2015), Matsumura and Ogawa (2014, 2017) and so on.
5Note that committing to being a CSR firm can be one way of strategically committing to
higher output. This formulation of CSR firms is related to the managerial delegation contract
with sales targets, in which firms have incentives to commit to putting a higher weight on
output to induce rivals to reduce their outputs in quantity-setting oligopolies. See, Vickers
(1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987).
6Recent analysis has emphasized that environmental concern is critical in the recent CSR
codes of conduct. See the discussions in Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Liu et al. (2015),
Hirose et al. (2017), Lee and Park (2017) and so on.
7The observable delay game was extended to a mixed market by Pal (1998), Lu (2006),
Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007), Lu and Poddar (2009) and Heywood and Ye (2009). For more extensive
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depending on the relative concerns on environment and consumers surplus, the
SR firm can be less or more aggressive in the production and abatement. There-
fore, not only the instrumental conflict between the two social interests but also
the significance of externality are crucial factors in determining the equilibrium
of endogenous timing game.
On the one hand, when the SR firm does not concern for consumer surplus
but cares for the environment, regardless of how significant the externality is
a simultaneous-move game is a unique equilibrium. This result is consistent
with Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), who first formulated an observable delay
game in a private duopoly between two homogeneous FP firms. Thus, we ex-
tend their analysis into the case with externality and show that in a mixed
duopoly with an SR firm having a high concern on the environment, the anal-
ysis of a simultaneous-move game is still useful. However, this result sharply
contrasts with the case of price competition with externality. For example, Lee
and Xu (2017) considered environmental tax and showed that a sequential-move
(simultaneous-move) game emerges in equilibrium when the externality is in-
significant (significant) in a private duopoly while the results are reversed in
a mixed duopoly.8 We further show that a simultaneous-move game emerges
in equilibrium if the ex-ante initial level of pollution emission is not signifi-
cant and the SR firm concerns for consumers surplus is not high, but entirely
accounts for the environmental externality it solely causes. This result also
includes the analysis of Matsumura and Ogawa (2017), who considered environ-
mental externality in a mixed duopoly and showed that a simultaneous-move
(sequential-move) game emerges in equilibrium when the externality is signifi-
cant (insignificant). In this case, the SR firm reduces output and thus always
obtains lower profits than FP firm in the equilibrium.
On the other hand, when the SR firm concerns for consumer surplus sig-
nificantly, two sequential-move games might be equilibria. In particular, if the
SR firm concerns for environment and accounts entirely for consumers surplus,
then regardless of externality two sequential-movements are the equilibrium of
the endogenous timing game. This result is consistent with Pal (1998), who an-
alyzed an observable delay game in a mixed duopoly between an FP firm and a
welfare-maximizing public firm. Thus, we extend his analysis into the case with
externality and show that the equilibrium does hold no matter how significant
the externality is. Further, we also show that the SR firm increases output if
it does not concern for externality significantly and thus it can obtain higher
analysis, see also Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2010), Tomaru and Kiyono (2010), Balogh and
Tasna´di (2012), Amir and De Feo (2014), Matsumura and Ogawa (2014, 2017), Naya (2015),
Din and Sun (2016) and Lee and Xu (2017) among others.
8In the literature on endogenous timing game in duopolies, the results are mostly reversed
depending on both whether firms compete in price or quantity and whether firms compete in
a private or mixed duopoly. For example, in a private duopoly with symmetric payoffs firms
decide simultaneously under quantity competition and sequentially under price competition,
whereas in a mixed duopoly with asymmetric payoffs firms decide sequentially under quantity
competition and simultaneously under price competition. See Hamilton and Slutsky (1990),
Pal (1998) and Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007)
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profits than its profit-seeking competitor in both leadership equilibria.9 This
result supports the analysis of Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), who consid-
ered a mixed duopoly where an SR firm competes with an FP firm and showed
that the SR firm could obtain higher profits than the FP firm if the market
size is large enough and the SR firm accounts for consumers surplus completely.
However, their analysis is confined to a simultaneous Cournot game, which is
not an equilibrium in the endogenous timing game in our setting where the
SR firm invests in pollution abatement. Thus, our finding implies that in a
mixed duopoly with a SR firm having a high concern on consumer surplus, the
analysis of a simultaneous-move game is problematic. However, if the SR firm
never concerns for the environment but cares for consumers surplus, then three
different equilibria emerge in the endogenous timing game. Further, regardless
of the externality, if the SR firm does not account for consumers surplus signif-
icantly, a simultaneous-movement also emerges in equilibrium. In these three
cases, we can also show that the SR firm increases output and thus it always
obtains higher profits than FP firm in the equilibrium. Thus, the analysis in
Lambertini and Tampieri (2015) holds in an endogenous choice game only when
the SR firm does not account for consumers surplus significantly regardless of
the externality in our setting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we for-
mulate a Cournot duopoly model with an SR firm and an FP firm. Sections
3 analyzes a fixed timing game and Section 4 analyzes an endogenous timing
game, respectively and examines illustrative cases. Finally, Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. Model
We consider there are two firms in a quantity-setting game. One of the
firms is an SR firm, (hereafter referred to as firm 0). This firm maximizes not
only its profits but makes an effort to decrease the pollution generated by its
production and cares for consumers surplus as well. The other is an FP firm
(hereafter referred to as firm 1) that maximizes only its profits.
Both polluting firms produce homogeneous goods and compete in quantities.
Firms sell their output q0 ≥ 0 and q1 ≥ 0, respectively, at the market clearing
price p(Q) = 1 − Q where Q = q0 + q1. We assume that both firms have
identical technologies and the production cost function takes a quadratic form,
c(qi) =
1
2q
2
i , (i = 0, 1).
Suppose that each unit of production generates e pollution emissions. How-
ever, the SR firm can make an abatement effort a per unit production to reduce
the pollution emissions. This e tells us how significant the pollution externality
is in a particular industry. For example, the emissions of the financial sector are
9Recent instrumental approach on the CSR also supports that firms can increase its profits
under the strategic CSR. For example, see Kopel and Brand (2012), Brand and Grothe (2013,
2015), Liu et al. (2015), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015) and Lee and Park (2017).
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not as substantial as the mining, textiles or clothing industries. We also assume
that both products in the same industry emit the same type of ex-ante pollu-
tants. Unlike other studies which consider end-of-pipe abatement technologies,
however, we consider a cleaner production technology in our analysis.10 In spe-
cific, the pollution generated by firm 0 after abatement effort is E0 = (e−a) ·q0.
The expenditure function of this abatement effort is a
2
2 . As in practice, most
pollutants cannot be decreased completely; therefore we assume e > a ≥ 0.
Because pollution abatement is costly, profit-maximizing firm 1 makes no effort
in the absence of environmental regulation and thus its pollution is E1 = e · q1.
The profit of SR firm is given by pi0 = p · q0− 12q20 − a
2
2 . We assume that the
SR firm maximizes profits plus a fraction of consumer surplus (CS), and as it
cares for the environment, it places a weight on the pollution that its production
generates. Thus, the payoff that SR firm maximizes is as follows:
V0 = pi0 − γE0 + θCS (1)
where CS = Q
2
2 . The parameters θ ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ [0, 1] measure the degree
of concern for consumers and the degree of environmental concern, respectively,
that the SR firm has. Both concerns are exogenously given.
The FP firm seeks only for profit maximization:
pi1 = p · q1 − 1
2
q21 (2)
The analysis of the observable two-stage delay game by Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990) is considered. In the first stage, each firm simultaneously chooses whether
to move early or late. In the second stage, the game played is simultaneous if
both firms choose the same period, and sequential otherwise.
3. Fixed timing
In this section, we first consider a fixed-timing game in which both firms,
SR and the FP, compete in quantities in a simultaneous-move game and a
sequential-move game, respectively. In the following analysis, we assume that
the three fixed timing games have interior solutions.
Assumption: For any γ ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [0, 1], e ∈ (e, e) where e ≡
max{ 2γ(3+θ)21−4θ , γ(2+θ)2(4−θ)} and e ≡ min{ 5+2θ−θ
2−γ2(2+θ)
γ(8−3γ2−2θ) ,
2(3+θ)
9γ }.
10End-of-pipe technology refers to an equipment setup by a firm that can reduce gross
pollution but leave the firm’s output unchanged. For example, see Wang and Wang (2009),
Pal and Saha (2015), Xu et al. (2016) and Lee and Xu (2017). On the other hand, clean
technology involves a change in a firm’s production process whereby it generates less pollution
per output, and therefore its output and abatement decisions are intertwined. See Chiou and
Hu (2001), Ulph and Ulph (2007), Jinji (2013) and Tsai et al. (2016).
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3.1. Simultaneous-move game
In this game, the SR firm independently chooses its abatement effort level
(a) and output (q0); and the FP firm chooses its production (q1). Solving the
first-order conditions for maximizing the payoffs of both firms in (1) and (2),
respectively, we obtain the following equilibrium quantities and abatement level:
qc0 =
2− 3eγ + θ
8− 3γ2 − 2θ , a
c = γ · qc0, qc1 =
2 + eγ − γ2 − θ
8− 3γ2 − 2θ (3)
where superscript ‘c’ denotes the Cournot game. The equilibrium profits and
payoffs are, respectively:
pic0 =
−σ1 + (2 + θ)
(
6− 5θ − γ2(6 + θ))
2 (8− 3γ2 − 2θ)2
V c0 =
σ2 + 12θ + γ
4θ − 5θ2 − γ2 (4 + 8θ − θ2)+ 12
2 (8− 3γ2 − 2θ)2
pic1 =
3
(
2 + eγ − γ2 − θ)2
2 (8− 3γ2 − 2θ)2 (4)
where σ1 and σ2 are as presented in Appendix A.
11
3.2. SR firm as a Stackelberg leader
In this case, first firm 0 chooses its output and abatement levels and then firm
1 chooses its output level sequentially. Then, we have the following equilibrium
quantities and abatement level:
qsl0 =
6− 9eγ + 2θ
21− 9γ2 − 4θ , a
sl = γ · qsl0 , qsl1 =
5 + 3eγ − 3γ2 − 2θ
21− 9γ2 − 4θ (5)
where superscript ‘sl’ denotes the equilibrium outcome in the Stackelberg game
with SR firm leadership. The resulting profits and payoffs are, respectively:
pisl0 =
σ3 + 4
(
21− 8θ − 5θ2 − γ2 (27 + 12θ + θ2))
2 (21− 9γ2 − 4θ)2
V sl0 =
9e2γ2 − 4eγ(3 + θ) + (5− γ2) θ + 4
42− 18γ2 − 8θ
pisl1 =
3
(
5 + 3eγ − 3γ2 − 2θ)2
2 (21− 9γ2 − 4θ)2 (6)
11For the sake of expositional convenience, we provide σi (i = 1, ..., 5) in Appendix A.
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3.3. FP firm as a Stackelberg leader
In this case, first firm 1 chooses its output level and then firm 0 chooses its
output and abatement levels. Then, we have the following equilibrium quantities
and abatement level:
qfl0 =
5+2θ−θ2−γ2(2+θ)−eγ(8−3γ2−2θ)
(3−γ2−θ)(7−3γ2−θ) , a
fl = γ · qfl0 , qfl1 = 2+eγ−γ
2−θ
7−3γ2−θ
(7)
where superscript ‘fl’ denotes the equilibrium outcome in the Stackelberg game
with FP firm leadership. The resulting profits and payoffs are, respectively:
pifl0 =
−σ4 + η1
2 (3− γ2 − θ)2 (7− 3γ2 − θ)2
V fl0 =
σ5 + η2
2 (3− γ2 − θ) (7− 3γ2 − θ)2
pifl1 =
(
2 + eγ − γ2 − θ)2
2 (3− γ2 − θ) (7− 3γ2 − θ) (8)
where η1 and η2 are as presented in Appendix B.
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4. Equilibrium in the Endogenous Timing Game
We now discuss the first-stage choice in an endogenous timing game. Each
firm i (i = 0, 1) simultaneously chooses whether to move early (ti = 1) or late
(ti = 2). If both firms choose the same period, the equilibrium is a simultaneous-
move game. Otherwise, the equilibrium is a sequential move game. Table 1
provides the payoff matrix of the observable delay game.
Table 1: Payoff Matrix of the Observable Delay Game
Firm 0/1 t1 = 1 t1 = 2
t0 = 1 (V
c
0 , pi
c
1) (V
sl
0 , pi
sl
1 )
t0 = 2 (V
fl
0 , pi
fl
1 ) (V
c
0 , pi
c
1)
Using the revealed fact that the payoff of a firm when it is the leader is
never smaller than its payoff in the simultaneous-move game, V sl0 ≥ V c0 and
pifl1 ≥ pic1, we have that (t0, t1) = (2, 2) never constitutes an equilibrium unless
V sl0 = V
c
0 and pi
fl
1 = pi
c
1. We can show that V
sl
0 = V
c
0 and pi
fl
1 = pi
c
1 never
hold simultaneously. Under these conditions, the equilibrium outcomes are as
follows.
12For the sake of expositional convenience, we provide ηi (i = 1, ..., 5) in Appendix B.
7
(a) (t0, t1) = (2, 1) emerges as an equilibrium if V
c
0 ≤ V fl0 ;
(b) (t0, t1) = (1, 2) emerges as an equilibrium if pi
c
1 ≤ pisl1 ; and
(c) (t0, t1) = (1, 1) emerges as an equilibrium if V
c
0 ≥ V fl0 and pic1 ≥ pisl1 .
Let θ¯0(γ) ≡ η32(7−3γ2) , defined on the interval [0, 1], and e0(θ, γ) ≡ η4γη5 , where
e0 : [0, 1] × (0, 1] → R monotonically decreases on θ such as e0(θ, γ) > 0 if
0 ≤ θ < θ¯0, e0(θ¯0, γ) = 0 and e0(θ, γ) < 0 if θ¯0 < θ ≤ 1. Comparing V c0 and
V fl0 , we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1. V c0 ≥ V fl0 for any γ ∈ (0, 1], if 0 ≤ θ < θ¯0(γ) and 0 < e ≤ e0(θ, γ).
When γ = 0, it holds for any e ∈ (0,∞) if 0 ≤ θ < θ¯0(0).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Let θ¯1(γ) ≡ 23−γ2 , defined on the interval [0, 1], and e1(θ, γ) ≡
2−(3−γ2)θ
γ(3−2θ) ,
where e1 : [0, 1] × (0, 1] → R monotonically decreases on θ such as e1(θ, γ) > 0
if 0 ≤ θ < θ¯1(γ), e1(θ¯1, γ) = 0 and e1(θ, γ) < 0 if θ¯1(γ) < θ ≤ 1. Comparing pic1
and pisl1 , we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2. pic1 ≥ pisl1 for any γ ∈ (0, 1], if 0 ≤ θ < θ¯1(γ) and 0 < e ≤ e1(θ, γ).
When γ = 0, it holds for any e ∈ (0,∞) if 0 ≤ θ < θ¯1(0).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Then, we also obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3. a) e1(θ, γ) > e0(θ, γ) for any θ ∈ [0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1]
b) e1(1, γ) = e0(1, γ) = γ − 1γ ≤ 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1]
c) θ¯1(γ) > θ¯0(γ), for any γ ∈ [0, 1]
Proof. See Appendix C.
From Lemmas 1-3, we obtain the following main result.
Proposition 1. In a mixed duopoly with a socially responsible firm, we have
the followings:
(i) For any γ ∈ (0, 1] and e ∈ (e, e):
(a) If 0 ≤ θ < θ¯0(γ) and e < e0(θ, γ), the only equilibrium of the game is
the simultaneous movement, that is, (t0, t1) = (1, 1);
(b) If 0 ≤ θ < θ¯0(γ) and e = e0(θ, γ), either the simultaneous movement,
(t0, t1) = (1, 1) or the sequential-move outcome in which the FP firm
is the leader, (t0, t1) = (2, 1), are equilibrium outcomes.
(c) If θ¯1(γ) ≤ θ ≤ 1 or e ≥ e1(θ, γ), either the SR firm or the FP firm
could be the Stackelberg leader of the game, that is, (t0, t1) = (1, 2)
and (t0, t1) = (2, 1), are the equilibrium outcomes.
(d) Otherwise, one sequential-move outcome in which the FP firm is the
leader, (t0, t1) = (2, 1), is the unique equilibrium outcome.
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(ii) When γ = 0, the equilibrium outcomes for any e ∈ (0,∞) are:
(a) If 0 ≤ θ < θ¯0(0), then (t0, t1) = (1, 1);
(b) If θ = θ¯0(0), then (t0, t1) = (1, 1) and (t0, t1) = (2, 1).
(c) If θ¯1(0) ≤ θ ≤ 1, then (t0, t1) = (1, 2) and (t0, t1) = (2, 1).
(d) Otherwise, (t0, t1) = (2, 1).
Proof. See Appendix D.
For economic explanations on Proposition 1, we examine four interesting
cases for illustration. First, consider a case with θ = 0 where the SR firm does
not care for consumers surplus but care for the environment. Then, Proposi-
tion 1(i) states that regardless of how significant the externality is, the only
equilibrium of the game is the simultaneous movement. (See Appendix E) This
result is consistent with the observable delay game in a private duopoly with-
out environmental externality, as formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
Thus, this case extends their analysis into the case with externality and shows
that does not matter how significant the externality is the simultaneous-move
outcome emerges in the equilibrium. This implies that in a mixed duopoly
with an SR firm having a high concern for the environment, the analysis of a
simultaneous-move game is very useful. However, this result sharply contrasts
with the case of price competition with externality, which is examined by Lee
and Xu (2017). They considered environmental tax under price competition
and showed that a sequential-move (simultaneous-move) game emerges in equi-
librium when the externality is insignificant (significant) in a private duopoly
while the results are reversed in a mixed duopoly. In our setting, furthermore,
the SR firm reduces output to reduce its pollution and thus we can show that
pic1 > pi
c
0 for γ ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, the SR firm always obtains lower profits than
its profit-seeking competitor at the equilibrium.
Second, consider a case with γ = 1 where the SR firm concerns for con-
sumers surplus but entirely accounts for the environmental externality it solely
causes (Note that we assume the marginal environmental damage is 1). Then,
Proposition 1(i) states that depending on how much the SR firm cares for con-
sumers surplus three different equilibria emerge in the endogenous timing game.
(See Appendix E) This result includes the analysis of Matsumura and Ogawa
(2017), who considered environmental externality in a mixed duopoly where
a welfare-maximizing public firm competed with an FP firm and showed that
a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) game emerges in equilibrium when the
externality is significant (insignificant). In particular, we can show that the
conditions for having the simultaneous-move outcome are 0 ≤ θ < θ0(1) and
e < e ≤ e0(θ, 1). That is if the concern on consumers surplus is not high
and the ex-ante initial level of pollution emission is not significant but the
SR firm concerns for environment significantly, both firms choose to move early,
that is a simultaneous-movement emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, sequential-
movements are equilibrium outcomes. In these three cases, we can show that
the SR firm reduces output and thus pi1 > pi0 for θ ∈ (0, 1] and e ∈ (e, e). That
is, the SR firm always obtains lower profits than FP firm in the equilibrium.
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Third, consider a case with θ = 1 where the SR firm concerns for the environ-
ment but accounts for consumer surplus entirely. Then, Proposition 1(i) states
that regardless of how significant the externality is two sequential-movements
are the equilibrium outcomes of the game. (See Appendix E) This result co-
incides with Pal (1998), who consider a mixed duopoly without environmental
externality. Thus, this case extends his analysis into the case with externality
and shows that does not matter how significant the externality is two sequential-
move outcomes emerge in the equilibrium. Further, we can also show that the
SR firm increases output if it does not concern for externality significantly and
thus pi0 > pi1 only if γ < 0.577 for both leadership equilibria. Thus, a neces-
sary condition for the SR firm to obtain higher profits than its profit-seeking
competitor in both leadership equilibria is that it does not concern for external-
ity significantly. This result supports the analysis of Lambertini and Tampieri
(2015), who considered a mixed Cournot oligopoly where an SR firm competes
with FP firms and showed that the SR firm can produce higher output and thus
obtain higher profits than the FP firms if the market size is large enough and
the SR firm accounts for consumer surplus completely. However, their analysis
is confined to a simultaneous Cournot game, which is not an equilibrium in the
endogenous timing game in our setting where the SR firm invests in pollution
abatement.
Finally, consider a case with γ = 0 where the SR firm never concerns for
the environment but cares for consumers surplus. Then, Proposition 1(ii) states
that depending on how much the SR firm concerns for consumers surplus three
different equilibria emerge in the endogenous timing game. (See Appendix E)
Further, we can show that the condition for having the simultaneous-move out-
come is θ < θ¯0(0). That is, regardless of the externality, if the SR firm does
not account for consumers surplus significantly, both firms choose to move early,
that is a simultaneous-movement emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, sequential-
movements are equilibrium outcomes. In specific, the condition for having both
sequential-move outcomes is θ¯1(0) < θ ≤ 1. Thus, regardless of the externality,
if the SR firm accounts for consumers surplus significantly, one firm chooses to
move early and the other firm later in the equilibrium. In the three different
equilibria, we can also show that the SR firm increases output and thus pi0 > pi1
for θ ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, the SR firm always obtains higher profits than FP firm in
the equilibrium. This result includes the findings of Lambertini and Tampieri
(2015), but we can show that their results hold in an endogenous choice game
only when the SR firm does not account for consumers surplus significantly
regardless of the externality.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper considered the heterogeneity of objectives among the firms in
which an SR firm concerns for not only consumers surplus but environmental
externality in the presence of clean technology. We examined how behavioral
heterogeneity and the significance of externality induce the equilibrium outcome
of the endogenous choice on the different market structure. We found that two
10
social concerns on consumers surplus and environment have opposite effects on
production and abatement, and thus the commitment to social concerns may
allow the SR firm to include different market structure in the equilibrium of
endogenous timing game. In particular, when the SR firm concerns for exter-
nality more, depending on the significance of ex-ante initial level of pollution
emission, a simultaneous-movement emerges in equilibrium and the SR firm re-
duces output and always obtains lower profits than the FP firm. However, when
the SR firm concerns for consumers surplus significantly, two sequential-move
games might also be equilibria and the SR firm increases output and obtains
higher profits than FP firm.
As a future research, it is also important to analyze the effects of the equi-
librium of the endogenous timing game on the environment and welfare con-
sequences. Further, governmental intervention on the CSR behaviors and its
implications on the endogenous choice of a market structure including pricing
and production strategies are also challenging policy issues.
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Appendix A. The values of σi
σ1 ≡ 3e2γ2
(
7 + 3γ2
)
+ 2eγ
(
2− 11θ − 3γ2(4 + θ))
σ2 ≡ e2γ2
(
27− 9γ2 − 8θ)− 2eγ(18 + θ − 2θ2 − 2γ2(3 + θ))
σ3 ≡ −27e2γ2
(
7 + 3γ2
)
+ eγ
(
132θ + 36γ2(6 + θ)
)
σ4 ≡e2γ2
(
144 + 9γ6 − 68θ + 8θ2 − 3γ4(9− 4θ)− γ2 (46 + 6θ − 4θ2))
+ 2eγ
(
15− 87θ + 41θ2 − 5θ3 − 3γ6(4 + θ) + γ4 (64− 8θ − 5θ2)− γ2 (91− 74θ + 5θ2 + 2θ3))
σ5 ≡e2γ2
((
8− 3γ2)2 − 29θ + 11γ2θ + 3θ2)− 2eγ(40− 7θ2 + θ3 + 2γ4(3 + θ)
− γ2 (31 + 5θ − 3θ2) )
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Appendix B. The values of ηi
η1 ≡75− 50θ − 32θ2 + 22θ3 − 3θ4 − γ6
(
12 + 8θ + θ2
)
+ γ4
(
72 + 28θ − 11θ2 − 2θ3)
− γ2 (135− 46θ2 + 6θ3 + θ4)
η2 ≡ 25+32θ−γ6θ−22θ2+3θ3+γ4
(
4 + 11θ − 2θ2)−γ2 (20 + 34θ − 14θ2 + θ3)
Let α = 19755 − 67932γ2 + 100440γ4 − 83146γ6 + 42020γ8 − 13236γ10 +
2531γ12 − 268γ14 + 12γ16. Then
η3 ≡44− 32γ2 + 6γ4 −
2 3
√
2
(
99− 175γ2 + 113γ4 − 31γ6 + 3γ8)
3
√
96− 399γ2 + 531γ4 − 316γ6 + 87γ8 − 9γ10 +
√
− (14− 13γ2 + 3γ4)2 α
− 22/3 3
√
96− 399γ2 + 531γ4 − 316γ6 + 87γ8 − 9γ10 +
√
− (14− 13γ2 + 3γ4)2 α
η4 ≡82− 63γ2 + 12γ4 − 3θ
(
55− 52γ2 + 17γ4 − 2γ6)+ (66− 48γ2 + 9γ4) θ2
− (7− 3γ2) θ3
η5 ≡6
(
4
(
1− γ2)+ γ4)+ (1− θ) (12γ4 + 4θ2 + (1− θ) (41− 15γ2)+ 62− 57γ2) > 0
Appendix C. Proofs of Lemmas
Lemma 1
V c0 − V fl0 =
(1−θ)(eγ+1−γ2+1−θ)
2(3−γ2−θ)(7−3γ2−θ)2(8−3γ2−2θ)2 (η4 − eγη5).
a) If γ ∈ (0, 1] the sign of the difference V c0 −V fl0 is the sign of η4− eγη5 which
is positive if and only if 0 ≤ θ < θ¯0(γ) ≡ η32(7−3γ2) and 0 < e < e0 ≡ η4γη5 .
b) If γ = 0, the sign of the difference V c0 − V fl0 is the sign of η4(γ = 0) =
82 − 165θ + 66θ2 − 7θ3, which does not depend on e and is positive if and
only if 0 ≤ θ < θ¯0(0) ≈ 0.658 .
Lemma 2
pic1−pisl1 =
3(2−(3−γ2)θ−eγ(3−2θ))(eγ(45−18γ2−10θ)+(1−θ)(47−25γ2−8θ)+(35−18γ2)(1−γ2))
2(8−3γ2−2θ)2(21−9γ2−4θ)2 .
a) If γ ∈ (0, 1], the sign of the difference pic1 − pisl1 is the sign of 2−
(
3− γ2) θ−
eγ(3 − 2θ) which is positive if and only if 0 ≤ θ < θ¯1(γ) ≡ 23−γ2 and
0 < e < e1 ≡ 2−3θ+γ
2θ
γ(3−2θ) .
b) If γ = 0, the sign of the difference pic1−pisl1 is the sign of 2−
(
3− γ2) θ, which
does not depend on e and is positive if and only if 0 ≤ θ < θ¯1(0) = 23 .
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Lemma 3
a) For any γ ∈ (0, 1],
e1 − e0 = (1−θ)
2(8−3γ2−2θ)(1+(1−γ2)θ)
γ(3−2θ)η5 > 0 for any 0 ≤ θ < 1.
b) By substitution of θ = 1, e1(1, γ) = e0(1, γ) = γ − 1γ .
c) From Lemma 3. a) and b), e1(θ¯0, γ) > e0(θ¯0, γ) = 0 = e1(θ¯1, γ); since e1
monotonically decreases on θ, we have θ¯1(γ) > θ¯0(γ).
Appendix D. Proof of proposition
Using Lemmas 1-3, we obtain the following table:
Table D.2: Payoffs comparison
θ/e e ≤ e0 e0 < e ≤ e1 e > e1
0 < θ < θ¯0 V
c
0 ≥ V fl0 & pic1 ≥ pisl1 V c0 < V fl0 & pic1 ≥ pisl1 V c0 < V fl0 & pic1 < pisl1
θ¯0 < θ < θ¯1 V
c
0 < V
fl
0 & pi
c
1 ≥ pisl1 V c0 < V fl0 & pic1 ≥ pisl1 V c0 < V fl0 & pic1 < pisl1
θ > θ¯1 V
c
0 < V
fl
0 & pi
c
1 < pi
sl
1 V
c
0 < V
fl
0 & pi
c
1 < pi
sl
1 V
c
0 < V
fl
0 & pi
c
1 < pi
sl
1
Appendix E. Cases
E1. Case with θ = 0
A graphical representation is shown in Figure E.1:
Figure E.1: Endogenous Timing Game Equilibrium with θ = 0
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Remark 1. When θ = 0, the only equilibrium of the game is the simultaneous
movement, that is, (t0, t1) = (1, 1).
Remark 2. When θ = 0, pic1 > pi
c
0 for γ ∈ (0, 1].
E2. Case with γ = 1
Remark 3. When γ = 1, the equilibrium outcomes of the endogenous timing
game are as follows:
(a) If 0 ≤ θ < θ¯0(1) and e ≤ e0(θ, 1), then (t0, t1) = (1, 1);
(b) if θ¯1(1) < θ ≤ 1 or e > e1(θ, 1), then (t0, t1) = (1, 2) and (t0, t1) = (2, 1).
(c) otherwise, (t0, t1) = (2, 1).
A graphical representation is shown in Figure E.2.
Figure E.2: Endogenous Timing Game Equilibrium with γ = 1
Remark 4. When γ = 1, we have
(a) pic1 > pi
c
0.
(b) pifl1 > pi
fl
0 .
(c) pisl1 > pi
sl
0 .
E3. Case with θ = 1
A graphical representation is shown in Figure E.3.
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Figure E.3: Endogenous Timing Game Equilibrium with θ = 1
Remark 5. When θ = 1, the equilibrium outcomes of the game are either the
SR firm or the FP firm could be the Stackelberg leader of the game, that is,
(t0, t1) = (1, 2) and (t0, t1) = (2, 1).
Remark 6. When θ = 1, we have
(a) pisl0 > pi
sl
1 for γ ∈ (0, .577) and e ∈ (max{e, ξ1}, ξ2), and pisl1 > pisl0 otherwise.
(b) pifl0 > pi
fl
1 for γ ∈ (0, .577) and e ∈ (ξ3, ξ4), and pifl1 > pifl0 otherwise.
Proof. When θ = 1.
(a) Let ξ1 ≡ 13+51γ
2−
√
289−1173γ2+999γ4−243γ6
9γ(8+3γ2) and ξ2 ≡
13+51γ2+
√
289−1173γ2+999γ4−243γ6
9γ(8+3γ2) .
Then
pisl0 − pisl1 =
5−106γ2−27γ4−27e2γ2(8+3γ2)+6eγ(13+51γ2)
2(17−9γ2)2 > 0 for γ ∈ (0, .577)
and max{e, ξ1} < e < ξ2.
(b) Let ξ3 ≡ 2(1+3γ
2)−
√
4−16γ2+13γ4−3γ6
γ(8+3γ2) and ξ4 ≡
2(1+3γ2)+
√
4−16γ2+13γ4−3γ6
γ(8+3γ2) .
Then
pifl0 − pifl1 =
γ(−γ(5+γ2)+4e(1+3γ2)−e2γ(8+3γ2))
6(2−γ2)2 > 0 for γ ∈ (0, .577) and
ξ3 < e < ξ4.
E4. Case with γ = 0
A graphical representation is shown in Figure E.4.
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Figure E.4: Endogenous Timing Game Equilibrium with γ = 0
Remark 7. Let θ ∈ (0, 1]. When γ = 0, we have that pi0 > pi1 at every
equilibrium of the endogenous timing game.
Proof. When the SR firm sets γ = 0. Then
(a) pic0 − pic1 = (3−θ)θ(4−θ)2 > 0 for any 0 < θ < θ0(0)
(b) pisl0 − pisl1 = 9+(149−32θ)θ2(21−4θ)2 > 0 for any θ1(0) < θ ≤ 1
(c) pifl0 − pifl1 = −1+(21−4θ)θ2(7−θ)2 > 0 for any θ0(0) ≤ θ ≤ 1
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